The paper presents an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. Using panel data for 123 countries in 1970-2000 it is analyzed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth. The results show that globalization promotes growth -but not to an extent necessary to reduce poverty on a large scale. The dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries. Although less robustly, information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect.
Introduction
Many non-economists expect the costs associated with globalization to exceed its benefits. Fears of an erosion of social and environmental standards, high poverty rates in less developed countries and ever higher frequencies of financial crisis resulted in protests like that in Seattle in 1999. Quite the contrary, most economists strongly believe the net effect of globalization to be positive. Apart from economic theory, this optimism is supported by empirical studies as well. To measure globalization, most of these studies employed proxies like trade and capital flows or openness to these flows. Using these proxies, Beer and Boswell (2001) examined the consequences of globalization on inequality. Li and Reuveny (2003) analyzed their effects on democracy. As Heinemann (2000) shows, more globalized countries have lower increases in government outlays and taxes. Vaubel (1999) found them to have lower government consumption.
The effects of globalization on growth have also been frequently analyzed with these measures. Until most recently, however, most studies examined them employing cross sections only. For example, Chanda (2001) uses an index of capital account openness to show that more developing countries have suffered from globalization than not, while Rodrik (1998) as well as Alesina et al. (1994) found no effect of capital account openness on economic growth.
1 With respect to foreign direct investment (fdi) there is evidence of a positive growth-effect in countries which are sufficiently rich (Blomström et al. 1992 ) and a negative one in low income countries (Garrett 2001) . 2 Among others, Dollar (1992) analyzed the relationship between economic performance and openness to trade, Frankel and Romer (1996) those between growth and actual flows. Their results show that both openness to trade and actual trade flows are robustly related to growth. All of these studies present, however, only cross sectional estimates. Moreover, they do not adequately control for endogeneity.
Their results might therefore reflect unobserved characteristics which do not vary over time instead of being the consequences of globalization or might reflect reverse causality.
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Aware of the shortcomings of the cross-section approach, some recent studies use panel data to examine the relationship between some dimensions of globalization and growth.
Among them, Dollar and Kraay (2001) found that an increase in trade flows and foreign direct investment resulted in higher growth rates. Greenaway et al. (1999) also report a strong 1 Edison et al. (2002) summarize the literature on capital account liberalization and economic performance. 2 Studies examining the effects of foreign direct investment on countries' growth rates have been summarized by Durham (2000) . 3 Dollar and Kraay (2001: 13) summarize criticisms of this approach.
relationship between trade and growth. With respect to fdi, Borensztein et al. (1998) provide evidence of a positive growth-effect -given a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Carkovic and Levine (2002) , to the contrary, do not find a robust influence of foreign direct investment on growth. A detailed analysis of the impact of several indicators of financial integration and growth is provided by Edison et al. (2002a) . Their results show that no robust relationship exists.
While those studies provide very detailed analysis of individual sub-dimensions of globalization, none of them examines the consequences of globalization on economic growth in greater detail. The effects reported might therefore appear only because other important aspects of globalization are omitted from the regressions. Most dimensions of globalization are strongly related to each other, so including them separately in a regression induces collinearity problems. Excluding those dimensions which are not the primary focus of the analysis -the method preferred in the literature -can, however, severely bias the coefficients estimated. Moreover, it is not obvious that all dimensions of globalization affect economic performance in the same direction. Since the overall effects of globalization are what matters, the lack of an overall measure and an analysis of its relationship with growth is a serious omission. The only study trying to measure overall globalization is A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy (2002) . They calculated a globalization ranking using various subgroups. Their ranking is, however, only available for three years. Moreover, important dimensions of globalization are omitted. The measure can therefore not be used in an empirical investigation.
This paper tries to contribute to the literature in examining the effects of several dimensions of globalization on growth empirically in a time-series cross-section context.
Since many of these dimensions are highly correlated, it is impossible to include them all individually in one regression. Therefore, the paper develops an index of globalization covering its most important aspects: economic integration, social integration and political integration. To measure these dimensions, 23 variables have been combined to three subindexes using an objective statistical method. The sub-indexes are in turn aggregated into one single index of globalization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I present the methodology and rationale of the index and present some results. I proceed by analyzing empirically the relationship between this index and economic growth. The final section draws conclusions.
Methodology and Rationale of the Index
Throughout the paper globalization is meant to describe the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multicontinental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods (Clark 2000: 86) .
It is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence (Norris 2000: 155) . Among others Keohane and Nye (2000: 4) highlight the following dimensions of globalization:
-economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges,
-political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies and -social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people.
To measure the degree of economic globalization, two indexes are constructed. One index measures actual flows: trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment (all in percent of GDP). Income payments to foreign nationals and capital employed (in percent of GDP) are included to proxy for the extent a country employs foreign people and capital in its production processes. The second index measures restrictions on trade and capital using hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current revenue) and an index of capital controls. Given a certain level of trade, a country with higher revenues from trade taxes is less globalized. To proxy restrictions of the capital account most previous studies employed rather crude measures. 4 Rodrik (1998) used the proportion of years for which the capital account was free of restrictions. Alesina et al. (1994) coded a 0-1 dummy variable. Since openness is not a yes-or-no question -it can and does occur in differing degrees in different countries -I employ an index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2002) . It is based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions and includes 13 different types of capital controls. The index is constructed by subtracting the number of restriction from 13 and multiplying the result by 10.
The data on actual flows and on restrictions are aggregated into two sub-indexes and one overall index as described below. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in the appendix.
To proxy the degree of political globalization, the number of embassies in a country, the number of international organizations to which the country is a member and the number of UN peace missions a country participated in are used.
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The aspects of globalization that are hardest to pin down relate to the flow of information and ideas. According to Keohane and Nye (2000: 4) , these constitute, however, the most pervasive form of globalism. Therefore, they necessarily have to be included in an index of globalization. I measure these flows distinguishing between three categories: data on personal contacts, data on information flows and data on cultural proximity. To proxy flows of information and personal contacts I use measures like international tourism, internet users, and number of radios, among others. The variables are shown in Table 1 . Like Saich (2000: 209) , I interpret cultural globalization as the domination of American cultural products. This is because the United States is the pacesetter in much of the global social-cultural realm (Rosendorf 2000: 111) . Cultural proximity could be proxied by the number of English songs in national hit lists or movies shown in national cinemas that originated in Hollywood.
However, the only proxy available is the number of McDonald's restaurants located in a country.
To construct the proxies for the empirical analysis, each variable is transformed to an index with a zero to ten scale, whereas higher values denote more globalization. When higher values of the original variable indicate higher globalization, the formula ((V i -V min )/(V max -V min )*10) has been used for transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicate less globalization, the formula is ((V max -V i )/(V max -V min )*10). This is the procedure employed by Gwartney and Lawson (2001) in the construction of their economic freedom index. The weights for the sub-indexes are calculated using principal components analysis. The year 2000 is used as the base year. For this year, the analysis partitions the variance of the variables used. The weights are then determined in a way that maximizes the variation of the resulting principal component. Therefore, the index captures the variation as fully as possible.
As Gwartney and Lawson (2001: 7) point out, this procedure is particularly appropriate when several sub-components measure different aspects of a principal component. I applied the same procedure to the overall index.
If possible, the weights determined for the base year are then used to calculate the indexes for each single year back to 1970. Where no data are available, the weights are readjusted to correct for this. Since the aim of the paper is to examine longer run changes, the yearly indexes are averaged over five years. 6 This is consistent with the analysis of Barro (1997) .
The weights for the sub-indexes are presented in Table 1 . The next section analyzes the influence of these dimensions of globalization on economic growth. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.
Empirical Estimates
To account for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity potentially correlated with the regressors, I use a fixed effects specification. A dummy for each of the five-year-periods is also included. All standard errors are estimated robustly. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in the appendix.
The first column of Table 4 includes variables typically employed in growth regressions (e.g. Barro 1997 ). The initial level of GDP per capita at each of the five-year periods is included to measure the conditional rate of convergence to the steady state growth rate. Secondary school enrolment and the log of life expectancy are employed as indicators of human capital. Since higher population growth should directly lead to lower per capita economic growth, the log of the fertility rate is also included. Higher domestic investment as a share of GDP should lead to higher growth rates whereas the effect of higher government consumption is not obvious a priori. On the one hand, a large government sector may induce inefficiencies and crowd out the private sector. On the other, the provision of an efficient infrastructure and a proper legal framework may promote growth (Hansson 2000) . To account for the quality of the legal system and the enforceability of property rights, a rule of law index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2002) is included in the regression. Obviously, better institutions should promote growth. Finally, I include the change in a country's terms of trade and its rate of inflation. Both have been shown to have a significant effect on growth in previous studies.
Most results do qualitatively correspond to those of Barro (1997) . Higher initial GDP is significantly associated with lower growth rates. Higher government consumption over GDP also leads to lower growth. The same is true for low investment and high inflation.
Growth rates are higher with better institutions and higher school enrollment. Whereas the coefficients of those variables are significant at the five percent level at least, the coefficient of a change in a country's terms of trade is only marginally significant, with a positive sign.
Life expectancy and fertility rates do not significantly influence economic growth.
Column 2 includes the overall index of globalization. As can be seen, its coefficient is King and Levine (1993) argue that the quality of a country's financial markets can influence economic growth. In column 3, variables to account for this quality are included.
Liquid liabilities are a typical measure of the financial depth and thus of the overall size of the financial sector, stock market capitalization (relative to GDP) is an indicator of the size of the stock market. However, confirming the results of Chanda (2001), these variables are completely insignificant. Due to missing data, the number of observations is reduced dramatically. This results in generally lower t-statistics. School enrollment and the rule of law no longer influence growth significantly. The globalization index, however, is significant at the five percent level.
In recent years, political and institutional variables have been found to have an impact on growth. 8 Sala-i-Martin (1997) reports a positive influence of civil liberties and political rights on growth. Another variable frequently included in growth regressions is an index of democracy (e.g. Fernandez, Ley and Steel 2001, Sala-i-Martin 1997) . Column 4 tests for these impacts. It includes the political rights and civil liberties index constructed by Gastil (2002) and the Polity-IV-indicator of democracy. However, none of these variables has a significant influence on economic growth. Again, the globalization index keeps its significance.
With some of the variables there is an obvious endogeneity problem: previous research has shown, that, e.g., fertility is influenced by measures of wealth (Barro and Lee 1994) . If fertility declines with growth, it is endogenous. The same is true for government consumption and investment. Endogeneity might even be a problem for the index of globalization. In the framework of the Arellano-Bond estimation discussed below, the right-hand side variables can be instrumented and the validity of the exogeneity assumption can be tested. The
Arellano-Bond estimator consists in first-differencing the estimating equation and using lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-identified and instruments must be weighted in an appropriate way.
I now regress the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of a five-year period on its lag and other variables, as opposed to regressing the growth rate on these variables.
However, the formulation of the model in differences means that the regression shows how changes in globalization affect growth.
Column 5 presents results from the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator, which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. 9 Applying this estimator leads to a dramatic loss of observations, since information from two periods is discarded by differencing and instrumenting. In some cases, this results in lower t-statistics. With one exception, the results are nevertheless similar to those obtained with OLS: GDP per capita at the beginning of the period is now significantly positive. This confirms the results of Dollar and Kraay (2001) . The index of globalization is significant at the five percent level, again with a positive sign.
Compared to the previous results, the magnitude of the coefficient is similar. The estimate shows that a one point increase in the index of globalization increases GDP growth by seven percentage points. The average yearly growth rate thus equals about 1.4 percentage points, slightly higher than the previous result of 1.09.
On the basis of the Arellano-Bond estimator, a Sargan test on the validity of the instruments can be conducted. This amounts to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates. As can be seen from column 3, the Sargan test accepts the over-identifying restrictions. Hence, strict exogeneity is not rejected. The Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must not be present in the data in order for the estimator to be consistent, also accepts the specification.
While the overall effect of globalization on growth was found to be positive, it is interesting to examine the effects of the single components. It is not obvious that economic, cultural and political dimensions of globalization will necessarily go along with or reinforce each other (Brown et al. 2000: 280) . As column 6 shows, only economic integration seems to be correlated with growth rates. Neither social nor political integration seem to have any influence on economic growth. One potential problem with this specification results from the high correlation between the three sub-indexes. 10 This probably results in lower t-statistics.
Therefore, the three dimensions of globalization are analyzed individually as well. In an effort to provide more detailed information, I replicate the analysis with the sub-indexes instead of the overall index of globalization. Table 5 starts with economic integration. There are various reasons why economic integration should promote growth. Trade makes it possible to exploit comparative advantages. Countries gain from specialization. Foreign investment might serve to close "idea gaps" between developing and developed countries (Romer 1993) . It often comes along with management educated in industrial countries. This management may try to press for reforms, in order to improve the business environment and enhance profits (Boockmann and Dreher 2003) . Since there might be spillover effects, foreign investment could increase the productivity of the whole economy (Rappaport 2000) . Workers from other countries probably produce similar effects. Openness to international trade should promote growth since it encourages gains from trade and fosters innovation and efficient production.
The effects of capital controls on growth are less obvious a priori. With open capital accounts, countries in need of capital can borrow abroad to finance investment, which promotes growth (Obstfeld 1998: 2) . Moreover, government interventions probably result in inefficiencies and underinvestment. They could also promote corruption. 11 On the other hand, however, such controls can ensure that domestic savings are channelled towards domestic investment (Chanda 2001: 5) . In some cases, capital controls increase the flexibility of monetary and fiscal policy. This could increase domestic growth rates.
Column 1 shows the results for the economic integration subindex (estimated by OLS). As can be seen, higher economic integration is significantly associated with higher growth. However, while actual flows promote growth rates (column 2), restrictions on trade and capital do not have any influence (column 3).
The insignificant coefficient of restrictions could reflect an average of the benefits from liberalization in countries with highly developed financial markets and institutions and the costs associated with a higher frequency of financial crisis in less developed countries.
According to the World Bank (2002: 10) , integration with global capital markets can lead to disastrous results without sound domestic financial systems. Garrett (2001) suggests that capital account openness promotes growth only in more developed countries. I therefore employ interactions of the restrictions-subindex with dummies for low, middle and high levels of GDP and the log of these countries' per capita GDP at the beginning of a five-year period. The results are reported in column 4. It turns out that freedom from restrictions significantly promotes growth only in high income countries. In low and middle income countries, the coefficients of the interactions are insignificant. 12 The insignificant coefficient does, however, not necessarily mean that liberalization does have no influence on growth in these countries. Even in the absence of a direct effect, lower tariffs probably lead to more trade, and liberalization of the capital account promotes foreign investment. Therefore, the absence of restrictions could increase growth rates nevertheless.
Columns 5 to 7 report results estimated with the Arellano-Bond estimator. Confirming the OLS results, the overall sub-index, the index of actual flows and the interaction of high income and restrictions significantly influence growth. However, the Sargan test rejects the instruments when the interactions are included. I therefore treat them as predetermined.
Column 7b shows the results. The coefficient of the high income and restrictions interaction term is highly significant. Both the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation now clearly accept the specification. Table 6 reports the results for the political dimension. This aspect of globalization has never been studied in the context of growth. However, political integration might influence growth rates. Economic globalization leads to the inability of national governments to control their citizens (Allison 2000: 83) . On the one hand, high political integration could serve governments as counterweight to globalized markets. They could cooperate to promote more redistribution than would otherwise be possible. This would probably reduce economic growth. A good example is pre-industrial-revolution-Europe. Low political integration and resulting competition between governments strongly promoted economic and technical innovations (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 137, Jones 1981: 138) . On the other hand, high integration could lead to reforms in political or economic processes and thus promote growth.
Examples could be monopoly regulation in the European Union or free trade zones like NAFTA and MERCOSUR. As columns 1 and 2 show, however, political integration is completely irrelevant for economic growth.
Finally, Table 7 reports results for social integration. As Boockmann and Dreher Since data on cultural proximity are available for only two periods, the Table includes only results on personal contact and information flows as well as the overall sub-index. As can be seen in column 1, social integration significantly promotes growth. The index of personal contact is only marginally significant, information flows are significant at the one percent level (columns 2 and 3, respectively).
When estimated with GMM (and thus in differences), all three indexes do not seem to influence growth (columns 4 to 6). The former results may thus emerge due to reversed causality. I therefore tried to estimate all regressions with the globalization variables lagged one five-year-period (not reported in the Table) . It turns out that only information flows have a significant influence on economic growth. This result is confirmed, when I treat information flows as predetermined in the GMM regression (column 6b). 13 Only this specification is accepted by the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test, while the overidentifying restrictions are rejected when the index is treated as exogenous.
Summing up, in addition to the overall index of globalization, several dimensions have a significant (positive) influence on growth: actual economic flows, capital and trade 13 When treated as predetermined, the overall social integration index is also significant at the one percent level.
restrictions in developed countries, and flows of information. The following paragraph examines the robustness of these findings.
Robustness Analysis
I test for the robustness of the overall index, actual economic flows, capital and trade restrictions in developed countries, and flows of information. First, I check for the influence of outliers using an algorithm that is robust to them. The algorithm minimizes the median (rather than the mean) of the residuals. 14 Second, I replicate all regressions (estimated with OLS and GMM) omitting the following sub-groups: East Asian countries, Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan-African countries, OECD countries and, finally, India and China.
Third, I include further variables which could influence the relationship between the indexes and growth: black market premium, overall budget balance, political instability, the theil index of inequality 15 as well as the variables of banking quality and institutional variables introduced above.
As an obvious shortcoming of the procedure used to derive the globalization indexes, changes in the index over time might to some extent reflect missing data instead of real changes in globalization. To examine this shortcoming, fourth, an alternative procedure has been used as well: In those years where no data for some categories are available, the latest data available have been employed for constructing the indexes. Changes in the index over time therefore only reflect changes in the underlying data.
To measure political instability, I construct an index employing the following variables: assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, crisis, riots and revolutions. Since those variables are highly collinear, they can not all be included separately in one regression.
Therefore an overall indicator is constructed, again using principal components analysis.
16 Table 8 shows the results of the stability analysis. It turns out that the overall index of globalization is not completely robust to the inclusion of further variables in the GMM regressions. In most cases, however, the coefficients do not become insignificant because of the inclusion of the variables but to the drastically reduced number of observations. For As can be seen in the table, information flows are less robustly related to economic growth. They loose their significance, when any of the additional variables except those accounting for institutional quality are included. Excluding OECD countries also destroys the coefficients' significance. Like the other indexes its is, however, highly robust to the construction of the index.
Conclusion
It has been shown, that, contrary to the beliefs of its critics, globalization indeed promotes growth. The overall index of globalization is highly significant in most specifications and has been shown to be quite robust to the inclusion of potentially relevant covariates in the regression as well as different estimation methods. These effects are economically relevant. As an example, it has been shown that Latvia could increase its economic growth rate from 5.94 to 7.1 if it would be as integrated with the rest of the world as Spain is. This example shows the limitations of the globalization process in reducing poverty as well. For Latvia to become as globalized as Spain would require enormous efforts.
Such effort is nearly impossible to achieve in the short run but will take many years. As another example, the country with the biggest (positive) change in globalization from 1975 to 2000 has been China. Its index increased by 2.14 points. According to the regression results from Notes: All indexes range from 0 (not globalized) to 10 (globalized). The countries are ranked according to their overall index score in 2000. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: o : significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level, **: significant at the 10 percent level. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Column 7b treats the interaction terms as predetermined, while all variables are treated as exogenous in the other columns. Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: o : significant at the 1 percent level *: significant at the 5 percent level **: significant at the 10 percent level. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: o : significant at the 1 percent level *: significant at the 5 percent level **: significant at the 10 percent level. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Column 6b treats information flows as predetermined, while all variables are treated as exogenous in the other columns. Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: o : significant at the 1 percent level *: significant at the 5 percent level **: significant at the 10 percent level. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each fiveyear period is employed.
Numbers indicate the significance level of the respective index. All regressions include the covariates of Table 4 , column 1. 
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